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In this paper, I present a model in which contagion of the liquidity crisis between
non-￿nancial institutions occurs due to the co-creditors￿learning behavior. The fact that
di⁄erent ￿rms share the same group of creditors leads to the transmission of information
on the type of other creditors from one ￿rm to the other. That is, after observing what
happens in one ￿rm, creditors get to conjecture the type of other creditors. And when they
decide their actions in another ￿rm, creditors re￿ect this information. Without common
knowledge of each ￿rm￿ s fundamentals, each ￿rm￿ s switching equilibrium - the threshold
for the liquidity crisis there - is uniquely determined and particularly the latter ￿rm￿ s
equilibrium is a⁄ected by creditors￿updated beliefs on the other creditors￿type. Analysis
of these switching equilibria shows that the contagion of the liquidity crisis from the ￿rm
having a small possibility to fail is more propagable than otherwise. Comparative statics
analysis provides policy proposals to mitigate the severity of contagion on the liquidity
crisis in the latter ￿rm. (JEL G33, G38, D82, D83)
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1. INTRODUCTION
Contagion is the propogation of solvency problems encountered by a single in-
stitution to other institutions. It is one of the most striking features of the ￿nancial
crisis in that the crisis spreads across countries and institutions. In late 1990￿ s,
most of east Asian countries su⁄ered the severe ￿nancial crises via contagion among
countries. It was called "Asian Flu." When South Korea su⁄ered the Asian Flu, we
observed that the liquidity crisis spread from one ￿rm to other ￿rms even though
their businesses were not closely related. For example, in January 1997, Hanbo
Steel Group - the country￿ s fourteenth-largest conglomerate - went bankrupt, and
within a few months, Jinro - the largest liquor group in Korea - failed. How can we
explain this contagion phenomenon that propogates the ￿nancial distress problem
from one ￿rm to the unrelated ￿rms? Can we just say that the entire economy￿ s
systemic risk caused that phenomenon?
1I started to write this paper when I took Haluk Ergin and David Levine￿ s Advanced Economic
Theory I (Fall 2008) at Washington University in St. Louis. I sincerely thank them for encouraging
me to embark on writing this topic. I also deeply thank Hyun Song Shin. He guided me with great
kindness to study global games and apply the concepts to ￿nance. I am grateful to Phil Dybvig,
Steve Fazzari, Armando Gomes, Radha Gopalan, Hong Liu, Stephen Morris, Bruce Petersen and
Guofu Zhou for their helpful comments on this work. I am truly appreciative of Todd Gormley￿ s
earnest advice on this paper having regular discussions with me. All errors and omissions are my
own. This paper is very preliminary as of now. Please do not distribute it without the direct
permission of the author. Copyright c ￿2009 by Dong Chuhl Oh. All rights reserved.
1In this paper, I present a model in which contagion of the liquidity crisis between
non-￿nancial institutions whose businesses are not even closely connected occurs
due to the co-creditors￿learning behavior: learning about others￿type. Some fairly
extensive studies deal with the contagion of the ￿nancial crisis between ￿nancial
institutions and/or international ￿nancial markets based on their interlinkages and
changes in asset prices. However, studies on the contagion of the liquidity crisis
between non-￿nancial businesses have received only scant attention. My aim is
to make a contribution to understanding the contagion phenomenon between non-
￿nancial institutions based on co-creditors￿learning behavior and to provide policy
proposals to reduce the severity of contagion.
I focus on the self-ful￿lling crisis - a crisis that occurs just because creditors
believe it is going to occur. This is an important feature since the liquidity crisis
in a ￿rm is often viewed as the result of a coordination failure among creditors.
However, this self-ful￿lling approach produces the multiple equilibria and thus it
is hard to demonstrate the contagion e⁄ect in the self-ful￿lling context. To get
the unique equilibrium, I employ the global games method introduced by Carlsson
and van Damme (1993). Global games technique has recently been applied to
explanations for ￿nancial crises in a number of papers.2 This method allows me to
get the unique equilibrium in each ￿rm, and therefore I can capture the contagion
e⁄ect in which the liquidity crisis in one ￿rm a⁄ects the likelihood of a crisis in
another.
Like the contagion setting of Goldstein and Pauzner [G-P] (2004), I examine
a sequential framework in which the events in ￿rm A take place before in ￿rm
B. Creditors in my model hold loans of two ￿rms￿investment projects. In each
￿rm, they can either roll over their loans until maturity, in which case they can get
the full repayment from the ￿rm if the investment project succeeds, or recall their
loans in the interim stage, in which case they can get some prematured liquidation
value (collateral debt) but less than the full repayment amount. The success of
the investment project depends on the fundamentals of the ￿rm and the number
of creditors who keep rolling over their loans until maturity in that ￿rm. That is,
creditors￿coordination on whether or not to roll over the loan determines whether
there will be the liquidity crisis in the ￿rm or not. There are two types of creditors.
One is "pessimistic" and the other is "optimistic." The terminology "pessimistic
creditors" means that they worry about the failure of the ￿rm￿ s investment project
more than "optimistic creditors."3
Following the global games method, I assume that creditors do not have com-
mon knowledge of the fundamentals of each ￿rm A and B. However, creditors get
noisy signals about the ￿rm￿ s fundamentals after they are realized. Di⁄erent type
of creditors get di⁄erent noisy signals. In this setting, creditors uniquely determine
their beliefs on the fundamentals of ￿rm A and their actions whether or not to roll
over the loans until maturity in ￿rm A. Before creditors determine their actions in
￿rm B, they observe the aggregate outcomes of ￿rm A which depend on fundamen-
tals and the behavior of creditors there. Observing what occurs in ￿rm A, creditors
update their beliefs about other creditors￿type and determine their actions in ￿rm
2Morris and Shin (2003) showed many applied examples of global games to economic models.
3In practice, this di⁄erent type re￿ects the strength of balance sheet of each creditor and the
degree of information advantage on ￿rm-related issues including the economic situation. That is,
a creditor with a weak balance sheet and/or information disadvantage on ￿rm-related issues is
more "pessimitic" than the other who has strong balance sheet and/or information advantage on
￿rm-related issues.
2B. That is, by learning the type of other creditors in the process of ￿rm A￿ s case,
creditors uniquely determine their beliefs on the fundamentals of ￿rm B and their
actions in ￿rm B. If there is the liquidity crisis in ￿rm A and ￿rm B also su⁄ers the
liquidity crisis by the creditors￿learning process, then I refer to this as "contagion"
of the liquidity crisis from ￿rm A to ￿rm B. I show that in each ￿rm creditors do
not roll over their loans until maturity if the fundamentals of each ￿rm are below
some threshold; and most importantly, the contagion e⁄ect from ￿rm A to ￿rm B
by creditors￿learning process changes the threshold values of ￿rm B. I refer to the
increased probability of the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B due to the contagion as the
"severity of contagion" on the liquidity crisis.
Having shown the severity of contagion on the liquidity crisis from ￿rm A to
￿rm B, I numerically analyze the phenomenon that the severity of contagion is
more serious when the originating ￿rm￿ s failure point ￿the probability that the
￿rm￿ s investment project fails - is lower. In other words, the contagion of the
liquidity crisis from the ￿rm having a small possibility to fail is more propagable
than otherwise. This is a very striking result compared with other contagion-related
papers which deal with the contagion between the international ￿nancial markets
and/or ￿nancial institutions through capital linkages and asset price changes. In
these papers, the larger the negative impact originating from worse fundamentals,
the more severely other ￿nancial institutions or countries are a⁄ected.
Also, I analyze the policy implications addressing how to reduce the severity
of contagion on the liquidity crisis from ￿rm A to ￿rm B by doing comparative
statics. Firm B can minimize the severity of contagion from ￿rm A by setting the
small value of its collateral debt. The government can also play a role to reduce
the severe contagion damage of the liquidity crisis by making the pessimistic cred-
itors more optimistic on the ￿rm￿ s fundamentals (e.g., providing bailouts to the
￿rm which su⁄ers a transitory liquidity problem) and by reducing the degree of
incomplete information on the creditors￿types in the market (e.g., implementing
￿nancial disclosure policy which discloses the type of creditors). Regarding credi-
tor￿ s information structure, I ￿nd that even though increasing the accuracy of the
creditors￿information on the ￿rm￿ s fundamentals lowers the failure point of the
individual ￿rm, it increases the severity of contagion.
For the global games setting of the ￿rm and creditors, I basically refer to Morris
and Shin [M-S] (2004). After showing the unique equilibrium in currency attacks
paper (1998), M-S (2004) analyzed the coordination game in debt market by using
tools of global games. They showed that the creditors of a distressed borrower
face a coordination problem, and without common knowledge of fundamentals of
the distressed borrower, the incidence of failure is uniquely determined given that
private information is precise enough. Bruche (2003) developed a continuous time
version of M-S (2004)￿ s model, and Takeda and Takeda (2008) investigated the role
of large creditors in determining the price of corporate bonds based on M-S (2004).
However, these papers are not concerned with the contagion, which is the central
issue of this paper.
There are several leading explanations about the contagion phenomenon.4 A
￿rst widely mentioned mechanism of the contagion is the existence of capital links
between ￿nancial institutions. Allen and Gale (2000) explained the systemic risk
in the banking industry with the introduction of interbank markets, and Cifuentes,
Ferrucci and Shin (2005) dealt with the contagion phenomenon between intercon-
4I mainly refer to Rochet (2004)￿ s arguments here.
3nected ￿nancial institutions focusing on changes in their asset prices. A second
mechanism of the contagion is the transmission of information by depositors. Chen
(1999) showed that the systemic risk may occur in the absence of any interbank
relations due to the ￿rst-come, ￿rst-served rule and information externalities on the
negative payo⁄s. A few papers including Kyle and Xiong (2001) and G-P (2004)
explained the contagion based on the wealth e⁄ects. Particularly, G-P (2004) used
global games method to explain the contagion phenomenon between two countries.
They looked at two countries that have independent fundamentals but share the
same group of investors. In their model, a crisis in one country reduces agents￿
wealth and which makes them more risk averse to the strategic risk associated with
the unknown behavior of other agents in the second country, increasing their in-
centive to withdraw their investments. Unlike the previous literatures, I focus on
the creditors￿learning behavior as the contagion mechanism. Learning process is
very important since it can directly explain the creditors￿strategic behaviors in a
coordination game.5
The remainder of this paper is as follows. I present the model in section 2, and
solve for the equilibria in section 3 where I explain equilibria from ￿rm A to ￿rm
B in sequence and show what the contagion is. In section 4, I de￿ne the severity
of contagion on the liquidity crisis and discuss some policy implications to reduce
the severity of contagion by doing comparative statics. In section 5, I discuss the
applicability of the model to real-world phenomena focusing on the case of 1997
Korea￿ s ￿nancial crisis. Section 6 concludes.
2. MODEL
Basically, here I extend M-S (2004)￿ s model to the case of two ￿rms / di⁄erent
type creditors.6
There are two ￿rms: A and B. Both ￿rms own no capital and ￿rms￿investment
projects are only ￿nanced by debts. The state of ￿rm i￿ s fundamentals is ￿i; where
i = A;B. ￿i can be interpreted as a measure of the ability of ￿rm i to meet short
term claims from creditors. The ￿rm remains in operation given that ￿i is large
enough to meet the claims from creditors. Otherwise, it is pushed into default. The
higher value of ￿i refers to the better fundamentals. ￿i is randomly drawn from the
real line. And I assume that ￿A and ￿B are independent.
A group of creditors are ￿nancing investment projects of two ￿rms. In other
words, two ￿rms share the same creditors. For the simplicity of my analysis, I
assume that those are in unit interval [0;1]. Each creditor is small so that an in-
dividual creditor￿ s stake is negligible as a proportion of the whole.7 There are two
5Taketa (2004a) analyzed the contagion phenomenon of currency crises between two countries
using global games method and learning process of speculators. However, he did not numerically
analyze the contagion e⁄ect and policy proposals. In my work, focusing on non-￿nancial insti-
tutions, I speci￿cally analyze the contagion e⁄ects and suggest policy proposals to reduce the
severity of contagion on the liquidity crisis from one ￿rm to the other.
6By doing so, I explain the contagion phenomenon between two ￿rms, which is dealt in the
next section.
7Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin [C-D-M-S] (2004) used the global games approach to
consider implications of the existence of a large speculator like George Soros in a currency crisis
in the dynamic setting. But they did not cover contagion e⁄ect there. Based on C-D-M-S (2004),
Taketa (2004b) analyzed the implication of the presence of a large speculator in contagious cur-
rency crises: making countries more vulnerable to crises but mitigating the contagion of crises
across countries. In my paper, for simplicity, I just assume all small players and the static /
simultaneous game setting.
4sub-groups of creditors: group 1 and group 2. The size of group 1 is ￿ and that
of group 2 is (1 ￿ ￿), where 0 < ￿ < 1. Group 1￿ s type is its private informa-
tion and it is "pessimistic" with probability q and "optimistic" with probability
(1 ￿ q). Group 2￿ s type is "pessimistic" and this is public information. I assume
that the type of creditors remains the same without big exogenous shocks such
as government￿ s intervention or whole market breakdown. "Pessimistic" creditors
worry about the failure of the ￿rm￿ s investment project more than "optimistic"
creditors. In other words, "pessimistic" creditors are more negative on the success
of ￿rm￿ s investment project than "optimistic" creditors. Hence, I can assume that
"pessimistic" creditors use ￿P as their discount factor which is less than ￿O ￿the
discount factor of "optimistic" creditors (i.e., 0 < ￿P < ￿O < 1).8
The investment project of each ￿rm is completed in period 2 and yields the
return vi (i = A;B) which is uncertain in period 0 because it depends on creditors￿
actions in period 1. Financings are undertaken by a standard debt contract. For
simplicity, I assume that both ￿rms have the same debt contract. That is, the face
value of the repayment is L, and each creditor receives this full amount in period 2
if the realized value of vi is large enough to cover the repayment of debt. At period
1, before the ￿nal realization of vi, the creditors have an opportunity to review
their investment. Hence, in this period, creditors have to decide whether or not to
roll over their loan until period 2. If creditors collect and liquidate the collateral
after they do not roll over the loan, the liquidation value of the seized collateral is
K￿ 2 (0;L). However, if the creditors collect and liquidate the collateral because
they cannot get the full repayment after they roll over the loan, the liquidation
value of the seized collateral is K￿, which is less than K￿ (i.e., K￿ < K￿ < L). As
M-S (2004) did, for the simplicity of my discussion, I normalize the payo⁄s so that
L = 1 and K￿ = 0. Then, creditors who do not roll over the loan at period 1 get
K which is in (0;1).9 In summary, the present values of the payo⁄s at the interim
stage (period 1) to a creditor are given by the following matrix:
Project succeeds Project fails
Rollover ￿m ￿ 1 = ￿m 0
Not rollover K K
where m is P for a "pessimistic" creditor or O for an "optimistic" creditor. I assume
K < ￿P < ￿O < 1:
I say "there is the liquidity crisis in a ￿rm" when the ￿rm￿ s investment project
fails. If I denote the proportion of creditors who do not roll over the loan of ￿rm i
by li, where i = A;B, then the ￿rm￿ s investment project fails if and only if li ￿ ￿i.
If the creditors know the value of ￿i perfectly before deciding on whether or not
to roll over the loan, their optimal strategies are as follows like Obstfeld (1996)￿ s
self-ful￿lling story: If ￿i > 1, then creditors will roll over their loans irrespective
of other creditors￿actions because the project survives even if every other creditor
recalls. Conversely if ￿i ￿ 0, then it is optimal for creditors not to roll over the
loan since the state of the fundamentals of the ￿rm is so bad and thus the project
8￿m (m = P or O) can be interpreted as the probability of the success of ￿rm￿ s investment
project. That is, "pessimistic" creditors put less probability (￿P) on the success of the project
than "optimisitic" creditors (￿O). If the future value of ￿rm￿ s investment project is L, then the
present value of this project is ￿PL and ￿OL for "pessimistic" creditors and "optimistic" creditors,
respectively.
9The exact value of K is K￿￿K￿
L￿K￿ by normalizing the payo⁄s, and it is in (0;1) since K￿ <
K￿ < L.
5fails even if all other creditors roll over their loans. When ￿i 2 (0;1], here comes
the coordination problem among the creditors. If all other creditors roll over their
loans, then the payo⁄ to rolling over the loan is 1 at maturity (period 2)10, so
that rolling over the loan yields more than the premature liquidation value K.
Meanwhile, if everyone else recalls the loan, then the payo⁄ is 0 which is less than
K, so that early liquidation is optimal. Hence, the common knowledge assumption
of creditors on ￿i leads to multiple equilibria.11
To get the unique equilibrium, I apply the global games method here: ￿i is
not the common knowledge. Rather, at the interim stage when creditors decide on
whether or not to roll over the loan, they receive private information concerning
￿i, but it is not perfect. In other words, each creditor in group j (j = 1;2) gets
the private signal: xij = ￿i + "ij, where "ij is uniformly distributed in the interval
[￿";"]. Note that the creditor￿ s present value of the expected utility of rolling
over the loan conditional on his private signal is U = Pr[￿i ￿ li j xij] ￿ ￿m, where
m = P or O. And that of recalling the loan is K. A strategy for the creditor is a
decision rule which maps each realization of xij to an action ￿rolling over the loan
or not rolling over the loan. An equilibrium strategy consists of (1) ￿rm￿ s switching
fundamentals (￿ ￿i) below which the project fails (i.e., liquidity crisis occurs in the
￿rm) and (2) creditors￿switching private signals (￿ xij) such that every creditor who
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The timeline (see ￿gure 1) is as follows:12 In the ￿rst stage, nature chooses a
type of group 1 creditors. And the state of the fundamentals (￿i; i = A;B) of
each ￿rm is realized. Each creditor in each group (j = 1;2) receives private signals
(xAj) on the fundamentals of ￿rm A and decides whether or not to roll over the
loan. In the second stage, each creditor in each group (j = 1;2) observes signals
(xBj) on the fundamentals of ￿rm B and decides his actions in ￿rm B. The exact
realization of the fundamentals of ￿rm A and the result of creditors￿actions (i.e.,
10At the interim stage (period 1), the present value of 1 is ￿P or ￿O for "pessimistic" and
"optimistic" creditors, respectively.
11As M-S (2004) mentioned in their paper, this type of coordination problem among creditors
is analogous to Diamond and Dybvig (1983)￿ s bank run problem.
12I generally follow G-P (2004)￿ s sequence.
6￿rm A￿ s project failure or success) are known to creditors before they decide their
actions in ￿rm B.13
3. SOLVING THE MODEL
In this section, I explain what happens in ￿rm A and then what happens in
￿rm B sequentially. By doing so, I show how and why the liquidity crisis in ￿rm
A triggers the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B. I derive the equilibrium strategies (￿ ￿i and
￿ xij) in each ￿rm i (i = A;B) and for each group j of creditors (j = 1;2), and de￿ne
the contagion.
3.1. Equilibrium in Firm A
The global games approach has shown that the equilibrium strategy consists of
(1) ￿rm￿ s switching fundamentals (￿ ￿A) below which the project fails (i.e., liquidity
crisis occurs in ￿rm A) and (2) creditors￿switching private signal (￿ xAj) such that
every creditor who receives a signal lower than ￿ xAj does not roll over the loan.
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A1P if group 1 creditors are "pessimistic";
x￿
A1O if group 1 creditors are "optimistic."
￿ xA2 = x￿
A2:
After getting a private signal in period 1, each creditor has to decide whether
or not to roll over the loan. The indi⁄erence condition gives the following equation:
K |{z}
payo⁄ from recalling
= Pr[rollover is successful j ￿ xAj] ￿ ￿m ￿ 1
| {z }
PV of the payo⁄ from successful rollover
(1)
Now, let￿ s think about the decisions of group 1 creditors. They privately know
their type ("pessimistic" or "optimistic") and also know group 2 creditors￿type
("pessimistic"). Hence, they know the value of ￿ ￿A : ￿￿
AP or ￿￿
AO. Note that "Aj :=
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13That is, before creditors decide their actions, they did not know the exact value of ￿rm￿ s
fundamentals. However, I assume that after the rollover game ends, creditors get to know the
true value of ￿rm￿ s fundamentals. As G-P (2004) mentioned in their paper, in equilibrium, it
is su¢ cient that creditors receive information regarding either the fundamentals or aggregate
behaviors of creditors since one can be inferred from the other.

















Next, let￿ s think about the decisions of group 2 creditors. They only know their
own type ("pessimistic") and do not know the type of group 1 creditors. They can
just conjecture the probability that the type of group 1 creditors is "pessimistic"
as q. They do not know the value of ￿ ￿A : ￿￿
AP or ￿￿
AO, either. Then the equation
(1) becomes:
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Lastly, let￿ s think about the critical threshold value of ￿rm A￿ s fundamentals
(i.e., switching fundamentals). The proportion of creditors who do not roll over the
loan is expressed as follows:
lA (￿A) = ￿Pr[xA1 ￿ ￿ xA1 j ￿A] + (1 ￿ ￿)Pr[xA2 ￿ x￿
A2 j ￿A]
= ￿Pr[￿A + "A1 ￿ ￿ xA1 j ￿A] + (1 ￿ ￿)Pr[￿A + "A2 ￿ x￿
A2 j ￿A]
= ￿Pr["A1 ￿ ￿ xA1 ￿ ￿A j ￿A] + (1 ￿ ￿)Pr["A2 ￿ x￿
A2 ￿ ￿A j ￿A]
= ￿
￿ xA1 ￿ ￿A + "
2"
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
x￿
A2 ￿ ￿A + "
2"
The critical threshold value is determined by:
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AO. The unique equilibrium values of the switching fundamentals of ￿rm A (￿￿
AP
and ￿￿
AO) and the switching private signals (x￿
A1P; x￿
A1O and x￿































(1 ￿ ￿1 ￿ (1 ￿ q)￿2 + ￿3): (13)
where
￿1 =
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)(￿O ￿ ￿P)
￿O (1 + 2" ￿ ￿)
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A1O hold since ￿; q; and " are in (0;1)
and 0 < ￿P < ￿O < 1 (see ￿gure 2 and ￿gure 3). The intuition of the inequalities
is the following: x￿
A1P is greater than x￿
A1O because the pessimistic creditors are
more likely not to roll over the loan than optimistic creditors. By the same logic,
￿￿
AP is greater than ￿￿
AO because ￿rm A￿ s project will be more likely to fail (i.e., be
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Figure 2: Firm A￿ s Switching Fundamentals
91,2) (j = Aj x
Creditors in group 1
(“ pessimistic type” )
do not roll over
the loan in firm A
Creditors in group 2
do not roll over
the loan in firm A
Creditors in group 1
(“ optimistic type” )
do not roll over





2 x P A
*
1
1,2) (j = Aj x
Creditors in group 1
(“ pessimistic type” )
do not roll over
the loan in firm A
Creditors in group 2
do not roll over
the loan in firm A
Creditors in group 1
(“ optimistic type” )
do not roll over





2 x P A
*
1
Figure 3: Creditors￿Switching Private Signals in Firm A
Firm A￿ s equilibrium is summarized in the following proposition.14
Proposition 1. Conditional on the type of group 1 creditors, there exists a
unique equilibrium in ￿rm A. In this equilibrium, each creditor in each group (j =
1;2) does not roll over the loan if his signal xAj is below ￿ xAj and rolls over the loan
if the signal is above.
Proof. I need to show that every creditor in each group strictly prefers not to
roll over the loan (prefers to roll over the loan) if his private signal is less than
(greater than) the switching private signals conditional on ￿￿
AP and ￿￿
AO. Suppose
that every other creditor follows the switching strategy. Then, an individual cred-
itor in each group takes ￿￿
AP and ￿￿
AO as given. From equations (2) and (5), the






AO. Therefore, for any private sig-
nal greater than the switching signal, the expected payo⁄ of rolling over is strictly
greater than that of not rolling over. Thus, it is optimal for a creditor to follow the
switching strategy given that every other creditor follows the switching strategy.
3.2. Equilibrium in Firm B
Now every creditor knows what happened in ￿rm A, including the exact value of
￿A. This conveys information about the type of creditors in group 1 to the market
because di⁄erent types use di⁄erent switching signals, resulting in di⁄erent outcome
in ￿rm A under certain conditions.
I can think about two scenarioes of ￿A. First, if ￿A = 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP], then the type
of creditors in group 1 is not revealed. Why? If ￿A ￿ ￿￿
AO, then the liquidity crisis
certainly occurs in ￿rm A regardless of the type of creditors in group 1. Meanwhile,
if ￿A ￿ ￿￿
AP, then the liquidity crisis never occurs in ￿rm A regardless of the type






A2 as " ￿! 0.
10of creditors in group 1. Hence, if ￿A = 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP], creditors in group 2 do not get
to know the type of creditors in group 1 and face the same game, which was played
in ￿rm A, in determining whether or not to roll over the loan in ￿rm B.15
Next, however, if ￿A 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP], then the type of creditors in group 1 is
revealed to the market. Conditional on such ￿A, the liquidity crisis occurs in ￿rm
A if and only if creditors in group 1 are pessimistic. Likewise, conditional on such
￿A which is between ￿￿
AO and ￿￿
AP, the liquidity crisis does not occur in ￿rm A if
and only if group 1 creditors are optimistic. Hence, if ￿A 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP], then the
new game is played by creditors whether or not to roll over the loan in ￿rm B.
In the following, I explain the two scenarioes: ￿A = 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP] and ￿A 2
[￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP]. In each scenario, I derive the equilibrium strategy (i.e., ￿ ￿B and ￿ xBj,
j = 1;2).
3.2.1. Scenario 1: ￿A = 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP]
In this scenario, the type of group 1 creditors is not revealed. Hence, the
equilibrium values of the switching fundamentals of ￿rm B and the switching private
signals are exactly the same as those of ￿rm A. This is the benchmark case of ￿rm
B, and particularly benchmark switching fundamentals of ￿rm B are (1) ￿￿
AO, if the
type of group 1 creditors is optimistic, and (2) ￿￿
AP, if the type of group 1 creditors
is pessimistic.
3.2.2. Scenario 2 ￿ 1: Liquidity crisis in ￿rm A when ￿A 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP]
This scenario implies that the type of group 1 is "pessimistic." Then, both
creditors in group 1 and 2 have the same switching strategy signal (say x￿
B). Hence,
the equilibrium strategy consists of (1) ￿rm￿ s switching fundamentals (￿￿
BP) below
which the project fails (i.e., liquidity crisis occurs in ￿rm B) and (2) creditors￿
switching private signal (x￿
B) such that every creditor who receives a signal lower
than x￿









(2" + 1) ￿ ": (14)
3.2.3. Scenario 2 ￿ 2: No liquidity crisis in ￿rm A when ￿A 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP]
This scenario implies that the type of group 1 is "optimistic." Then, creditors
in group 1 and 2 have di⁄erent switching strategy signals (say x￿
B1 for group 1 and
x￿
B2 for group 2). Hence, the equilibrium strategy consists of (1) ￿rm￿ s switching
fundamentals (￿￿
BO) below which the project fails (i.e., ￿rm B su⁄ers the liquidity
crisis) and (2) creditors￿switching private signal (x￿
B1 for group 1 and x￿
B2 for group
2) such that every creditor in group 1 who receives a signal lower than x￿
B1 does not
roll over the loan and that every creditor in group 2 who receives a signal lower than






), even though the number of creditors who did not
roll over their loans is known, the type of creditors in group 1 is not revealed since xA1 is in the
"-neighborhood of ￿A and x￿
A1P and x￿
A1O are very closely located in ￿￿
AP and ￿￿
AO, respectively.
16The derivation is in Appendix.
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B hold since ￿ and " are in (0;1) and




B2 because when all creditors are pessimistic, they are more likely
not to roll over the loan than when there exist optimistic creditors. By the same
logic, ￿￿
BP is greater than ￿￿
BO because ￿rm B￿ s project will be more likely to fail
(i.e., be liquidated early) if creditors in group 1 are pessimistic.
Firm B￿ s equilibrium is summarized as follows.
Proposition 2. Conditional on the realized underlying state of the fundamen-
tals of ￿rm A (￿A) and whether the liquidity crisis occurs in ￿rm A or not, there
exists a unique equilibrium in ￿rm B. When the realized underlying state of the
fundamentals of ￿rm A (￿A) is not in the interval [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP], the same equilibrium
values (switching fundamentals and switching private signals) as those of ￿rm A
are obtained irrespective of whether the liquidity crisis occurs in ￿rm A or not.
Meanwhile, when ￿A 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP] and there is the liquidity crisis in ￿rm A, every
creditor in any group does not roll over the loan if his signal xBj (j = 1;2) is below
x￿
B and rolls over the loan if the signal is above; and when ￿A 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP] but there
is no liquidity crisis in ￿rm A, each creditor in group 1 does not roll over the loan
if his signal xB1 is below x￿
B1 and each creditor in group 2 does not roll over the
loan if his signal xB2 is below x￿
B2.
Proof. Follows from the same logic as proof of Proposition 1.
3.3. Contagion of the Liquidity Crisis from Firm A to Firm B
3.3.1. What is Contagion?
In this paper, contagion is de￿ned as the propogation of solvency problems
between two ￿rms. And the contagion of the liquidity crisis from ￿rm A to ￿rm
B is propagated by creditors who determine whether or not to roll over the loan.
After observing what happened in ￿rm A, creditors will update their beliefs about
other creditors￿types and re￿ ect this information on their optimal decisions in ￿rm
B. If the realized fundamentals of ￿rm A (￿A) is so bad, which means ￿A ￿ ￿￿
AO,
then ￿rm A su⁄ers the liquidity crisis regardless of creditors￿recalls. In this case,
the type of group 1 creditors is not revealed. So if ￿A ￿ ￿￿
AO, then this does not
cause the contagion of the liquidity crisis from ￿rm A to ￿rm B because group 2
creditors￿decisions in ￿rm B are not a⁄ected by the situation in ￿rm A. Only when
￿A is between ￿￿
AO and ￿￿
AP and there is the liquidity crisis in ￿rm A, I can discuss
whether there is the contagion of the liquidity crisis from ￿rm A to ￿rm B.
As I discussed in section 3:2, if ￿A 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP] and there is no liquidity crisis in
￿rm A, this implies that the type of group 1 creditors is "optimistic." This informa-
tion is re￿ ected on group 2 creditors￿decisions and the switching fundamentals ￿￿
BO
17The derivation is in Appendix.
12is determined. Likewise, if ￿A 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP] and there is the liquidity crisis in ￿rm
A, this implies that the type of group 1 creditors is "pessimistic." This information
is re￿ ected on group 2 creditors￿decisions and the switching fundamentals ￿￿
BP is
determined. That is, only when ￿A 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP], the behavior of creditors in ￿rm
A a⁄ects their behavior in ￿rm B.
Now if the realized fundamentals of ￿rm B (￿B) is so bad, which means ￿B ￿
￿￿
BO, then ￿rm B su⁄ers the liquidity crisis regardless of the occurrence of the
liquidity crisis in ￿rm A. Hence in this case, even though there are liquidity crises
in both ￿rms, I cannot say there is the contagion of solvency problems from ￿rm
A to ￿rm B. Meanwhile, if ￿B is between ￿￿
BO and ￿￿
BP and there is the liquidity
crisis in ￿rm B, then this is the contagion of the liquidity crisis from ￿rm A to ￿rm
B since there can be the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B in ￿B 2 [￿￿
BO;￿￿
BP] only when
there was the liquidity crisis in ￿rm A in ￿A 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
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Figure 4: Contagion of Liquidity Crisis from Firm A to Firm B
Definition 1. The contagion of the liquidity crisis from ￿rm A to ￿rm B
by creditors￿learning behavior is that there is the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B when
￿B 2 [￿￿
BO;￿￿
BP]; and there was the liquidity crisis in ￿rm A when ￿A 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP].
3.3.2. Scenario 1 versus scenario 2
Now, let￿ s compare the scenario 1 (￿A = 2 [￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP]) with the scenario 2 (￿A 2
[￿￿
AO;￿￿
AP]). From scenario 1, I get the benchmark switching fundamentals (￿￿
AO and
￿￿
AP) in ￿rm B. Meanwhile, from scenario 2, I get the new switching fundamentals
(￿￿
BO and ￿￿
BP) in ￿rm B. By comparing these values of switching fundamentals, I
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> 0:
13From the fact that ￿￿
AP ￿ ￿￿









































Figure 5: Values of Switching Fundametals (Firm B)
The intuition of the inequalities is as follows: If the type of group 1 creditors is
revealed and it is "optimistic," then the liquidity crisis less likely occurs in ￿rm B
compared to the case where the type is not revealed (i.e., ￿￿
BO < ￿￿
AO). Meanwhile,
if the type of group 1 creditors is revealed and it is "pessimistic," then the liquidity
crisis more likely occurs in ￿rm B compared to the case where the type is not
revealed (i.e., ￿￿
BP > ￿￿
AP). That is, if the type of creditors is known, the accident
of whether the liquidity crisis occurs or not becomes more clear.
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this section, after de￿ning the severity of contagion on the liquidity crisis, I
show that the impact of contagion originating from the ￿rm considered less likely
to fail is bigger than otherwise. Then, I do comparative statics on the severity of
contagion with respect to variables which comprise the severity of contagion. By
doing so, I suggest some policy implications to reduce the severity of contagion.
4.1. Severity of Contagion on the Liquidity Crisis




BP hold. What does
this imply? This means that if the type of group 1 creditors is revealed as being
"pessimistic," then the probability of the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B is increased by
the di⁄erence between ￿￿
BP and ￿￿
AP. This is the negative e⁄ect of contagion on the
liquidity crisis in ￿rm B. It is sure that if the type of group 1 creditors is revealed as
being "optimistic," then the probability of the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B is decreased
by the di⁄erence between ￿￿
AO and ￿￿
BO. This can be interpreted as the positive
e⁄ect on reducing the probability of the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B via revelation of
the optimistic type of group 1 creditors. I focus on the negative e⁄ect of contagion
on the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B as the severity of contagion. That is, I de￿ne the
severity of contagion as the di⁄erence between the new switching fundamentals for
the pessimistic-type creditors (￿￿
BP) and the benchmark switching fundamentals for
the pessimistic-type creditors (￿￿
AP).
Definition 2. The severity of contagion on the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B is
the increased probability of the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B due to the negative e⁄ect
of contagion: the di⁄erence between the new switching fundametals ￿￿
BP and the
benchmark switching fundamentals ￿￿




￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿O ￿ ￿P)(1 ￿ q)K
￿O￿P (1 + 2" ￿ ￿)
;
which is greater than 0 since ￿; "; q; K; ￿O; and ￿P are in (0;1).18
18How can I express the positive e⁄ect on reducing the probability of the liquidity crisis in
14Now, I get the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The liquidity crisis in the ￿rm having a small possibility to
fail is more contagious than otherwise.




AP.19 This is trivial since the decrease of ￿￿
AP will increase the di⁄erence
between ￿￿
BP and ￿￿
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which implies that the severity of contagion (SC) is decreasing with ￿￿
AP.
This proposition says that the severity of contagion decreases with the level of
￿rm A￿ s failure point (i.e., ￿rm A￿ s switching fundamentals). It implies that the
occurrence of the liquidity crisis in the ￿rm considered less likely to fail (i.e., the
￿rm having a lower failure point) would lead to a huge surprise in the market and
hence the liquidity crisis can become more contagious than otherwise. The recent
huge negative spillover e⁄ect of the ￿nancial crisis from the U.S. to the other whole
countries can be understood in the same thread. That is, even though the failure
point of the U.S. economic fundamentals is very low, there is an economic downturn
in the U.S these days. This leads to a big surprise in the world economy, and thus
the propogation of the ￿nancial crisis from the U.S. is so severe to other countries.
Meanwhile in 2002, we observed that the Argentine ￿nancial crisis was not severely
propagable to the other countries which were considered to have better economic
fundamentals than Argentina.
In summary, the contagion impact of the liquidity crisis in the ￿rm considered
less likely to fail is much bigger than that in the ￿rm considered to be not good
enough to endure the liquidity crisis. This is very striking since other previous
contagion-related papers which deal with the contagion between the international
￿nancial markets and/or ￿nancial institutions through capital linkages and asset
price changes showed that the larger the negative impact originating from worse
fundamentals, the more severely other ￿nancial institutions or countries are af-
fected. However in my work, I ￿nd that the severity of contagion is more serious
when the originating ￿rm￿ s failure point is low if I focus on co-creditors￿learning




￿O￿P (1+2"￿￿) , which is only di⁄erent in the term of q rather than (1 ￿ q) for SC. That is,
the sign of the comparative statics of ￿￿
AO ￿ ￿￿
BO with respect to the variables which comprise
it is totally the same as SC￿ s case except for q. This brings the trade-o⁄ relation of the policy
proposals for reducing the severity of contagion, which I tackle in latter sections (e.g., the initial
policies regarding K, " and ￿).
19By the de￿nition of ￿rms￿switching fundamentals, the low value of the switching fundamentals
means that the ￿rm fails with a small probability. That is, Firm￿ s switching fundamentals can be
interpreted as its failure point.
15behaviors between non-￿nancial institutions whose businesses are not related with
each other (i.e., independent fundamentals) and assume that the exact realization
of the fundamentals of the originating ￿rm and the result of creditors￿actions (i.e.,
￿rm￿ s project failure or success) are known to creditors before they determine their
actions in the other ￿rm.
4.2. Changes in the Value of Collateralized Debt (K)
As M-S (2003, 2004) mentioned in their papers, increasing the value of collateral
(K) has two contrasting e⁄ects: ￿rst, it increases the value of debt (loan) in the
event of default (i.e., the direct e⁄ect); second, it increases the range of ￿ at which
default occurs (i.e., the strategic e⁄ect20). In the contagion context, I ￿nd that the
strategic e⁄ect outweighs the direct e⁄ect, which means that decreasing the value
of collateral (K) is helpful to reduce the severity of contagion on the side of ￿rm
B.
Proposition 4. The severity of contagion on the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B is





￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿O ￿ ￿P)(1 ￿ q)
￿O￿P (1 + 2" ￿ ￿)
> 0;
which implies that if ￿rm B decreases the value of K, then the severity of contagion
on the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B (SC) will be reduced.
What is the intuition of this proposition? The decreased value of collateral is
the increased cost of not rolling over the loan from creditors￿standpoint. Hence,
creditors have more incentive to roll over their loans until maturity when the value
of the collateral is small than otherwise. Then, ￿rm B can reduce the severity of
contagion on the liquidity crisis from ￿rm A to itself. However, initially setting the
value of collateral small makes the value of the loan decrease even though it helps
reduce the severity of contagion.
4.3. Changes in the Gap of Discount Factors (￿O and ￿P)
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) argued in their paper that the deposit insurance
by the government can prevent the bank runs even though it might generate moral
hazard problem. That is, patient agents know that the withdrawal by others is not
going to harm their long-term return and will not withdraw their deposits. Likewise,
let￿ s think about the government￿ s provision of bailouts to the ￿rm which su⁄ers
a transitory liquidity problem. After observing the liquidity crisis in ￿rm A and
getting to know that the type of group 1 creditors is pessimistic, the government
can expect the contagion of the liquidity crisis from ￿rm A to ￿rm B. If the
government provides bailouts to ￿rm B which is thought of su⁄ering a transitory
liquidity problem even though its state of the fundamentals is not too bad, then it
is a good signal for the success of ￿rm B￿ s investment project in the market. In this
case, pessimistic creditors become more optimistic toward the ￿rm B￿ s investment
project (i.e., ￿P ￿! ￿O). That is, the gap between ￿O and ￿P decreases, and hence
20In my model, I can verify this strategic e⁄ect result from ￿￿
AP in equation (9) and ￿￿
BP in
equation (14).
16it reduces the severity of contagion on the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B.21 I summarize
this argument in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The severity of contagion on the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B is
reduced by the decrease in (￿O ￿ ￿P) which is obtained by the government￿ s provision
of bailouts to ￿rm B.
Proof.
@SC
@ (￿O ￿ ￿P)
=
￿(1 ￿ ￿)(1 ￿ q)K
￿O￿P (1 + 2" ￿ ￿)
> 0;
which implies that if the government decreases (￿O ￿ ￿P) by providing bailouts to
￿rm B, then the severity of contagion on the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B (SC) will
be reduced.
4.4. Changes in the Information Structure (")
As creditors￿ information on ￿rm￿ s fundamentals becomes very precise (i.e.,
" ￿! 0), the value of ￿rm￿ s switching fundamentals is decreased.22 In the similar
context, M-S (2004) emphasized the role of transparent information in the crisis
episode. Now, what is the e⁄ect of small noise (i.e., precise information on ￿rm￿ s
fundamentals) on the severity of contagion? Will the precise information on ￿rm￿ s
fundamentals reduce the severity of contagion? The result looks very surprising,
that is, I ￿nd that it increases the severity of contagion.
Proposition 6. The severity of contagion on the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B is





2￿(1 ￿ ￿)(￿O ￿ ￿P)(1 ￿ q)K
￿O￿P (1 + 2" ￿ ￿)
2 < 0;
which implies that if creditors￿(private) information on the ￿rm￿ s fundamentals
becomes very precise (i.e., " ￿! 0), then the severity of contagion on the liquidity
crisis in ￿rm B (SC) will be increased.
If creditors￿information on ￿rm￿ s fundamentals is very accurate, then the prob-
ability of ￿rm A￿ s liquidity crisis is reduced, i.e., the failure point of ￿rm A (￿￿
AP)
becomes lower. However, if there occurs the liquidity crisis in ￿rm A even though
" is very small, then the contagion of the liquidity crisis to ￿rm B is more severe.
This can be interpreted as Proposition 3 addressed. That is, if the liquidity crisis
occurs in the ￿rm considered less likely to fail (i.e., small failure point (￿￿
AP) via
small ") then it leads to a big surprise in the market and thus the liquidity crisis
can be more contagious.
4.5. Changes in the Size of Group 1 (￿)
The size of group 1 creditors, which is measured by ￿, represents the incomplete
information in the market. That is, even though the type of group 2 creditors
21In the very extreme case where the government "fully" guarantees ￿rm B￿ s investment project,
then there occurs no contagion of the liquidity crisis from ￿rm A to ￿rm B.
22In my model, I can verify this result from ￿￿
AP in equation (9) for instance. By the way, note
that ￿￿
BP in equation (14) and ￿￿
BO in equation (15) do not have " since the type of group 1
creditors is the known fact when those switching fundamentals are decided.
17is "pessimistic," which is public information in the market, the type of group 1
creditors is not known in the market initially. What is the e⁄ect of this incomplete
information on the severity of contagion? In other words, what is the impact of the
degree of incomplete information on the contagion? I show the e⁄ect of ￿ on the
severity of contagion when " converges to zero in the following proposition.23
Proposition 7. The severity of contagion on the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B is





(￿O ￿ ￿P)(1 ￿ q)K
￿O￿P
> 0 as " ￿! 0;
which implies that as the size of group 1 is very small and creditors￿ (private)
information on ￿rm￿ s fundamentals is very precise, then the severity of contagion
on the liquidity crisis in ￿rm B (SC) will be decreased.
What does this proposition imply? As I said above, the size of group 1 stands
for the incomplete information in the market initially. If the size of this incomplete
information becomes small, then the contagion of the liquidity crisis becomes less
severe. Hence, the government can mitigate the severity of contagion by regulating
the size of this incomplete information. For example, the government reinforces
creditors to reveal their types via ￿nancial disclosure policy (i.e., to disclose their
￿nancial information in the market). In the extreme case where ￿nancial disclosure
perfectly reveals the type of group 1 creditors in the market, then there occurs no
learning process among creditors and thus there is no contagion of the liquidity
crisis from ￿rm A to ￿rm B.
Related to the issue of the revelation of the type of group 1 creditors via ￿nancial
disclosure policy, what is the e⁄ect of the type of group 1 creditors on the severity
of contagion? The type of group 1 creditors is "pessimistic" with probability q.
I ￿nd that the severity of contagion is decreasing with q24, which implies that if
group 2 creditors initially expect that group 1 creditors are more likely the same
type as theirs, then the learning process of creditors￿type does not have as much
impact on the contagion of the liquidity crisis as otherwise.
5. DISCUSSION IN REAL-WORLD PHENOMENA
In order to assess the applicability of my model to real-world phenomena, let me
revisit 1997 Korea￿ s ￿nancial crisis in the middle of Asian Flu.25 The bankruptcy
of Hanbo Steel Group was a sobering experience for Korean banks. They started
to strictly reexamine the pro￿tability of their loans on other companies and call in
most of short-term loans. This led to a "domino e⁄ect" as more and more com-
panies su⁄ered liquidity crises. For example, Kia Motors - Korea￿ s eighth-largest
conglomerate - failed even though its reputation in the market was fairly good.26
23When " does not converge to zero, the e⁄ect of ￿ on the severity of contagion depends on the
relative size of ￿ and ". Hence, here I tackle the case where " converges to zero, which means that
the information of creditors on ￿rm￿ s fundamentals is very precise.
24￿￿
AP is increasing in q, but ￿￿
BP is independent of q. That is, SC (:=￿￿
BP ￿￿￿
AP) is decreasing
in q. Speci￿cally, I get @SC
@q = ￿
￿(1￿￿)(￿O￿￿P )K
￿O￿P (1+2"￿￿) < 0.
25I mainly refer to Rhee (1998) here.
26In 1998, Kia was merged by Hyundai Motor.
18The rush continued and as I mentioned in section 1, Jinro - Korea￿ s nineteenth-
largest conglomerate and also the largest liquor group - failed. By the end of 1997,
over 15,000 companies, large and small, went bankrupt. In the process of serial
￿rms￿failures, foreign banks (especially, Japanese and U.S. banks27) pulled out
their money en masse. And some Korean domestic banks (e.g., Korea First Bank
(KFB)28) dramatically stopped rolling over their loans in ￿rms.
This case of Korea￿ s ￿nancial crisis in 1997 is consistent with my model. Note
that Korea had a bank-centered ￿nancial system. Korean ￿rms were highly lever-
aged by short-term loans of the domestic and foreign banks. By the end of 1996, the
corporate debt relative to nominal GDP ratio was over 1.6, and the external debt
to GDP ratio reached approximately 25% in which the share of short-term debt
out of the total external debt peaked at 58%. Also note that as of the end of 1997,
among 26 domestic commercial banks, 16 nationwide commercial banks29 were ac-
tually common bank creditors of the top 30 conglomerates in Korea. Observing
Hanbo Steel Group￿ s liquidity crisis, common bank creditors could conjecture other
creditors￿types.30 And re￿ ecting this information, co-bank creditors decided their
own actions - rolling over their loans or not - in other ￿rms. Noting that there
were no fundamental linkages among many ￿rms which went bankrupt; and noting
the leading roles of foreign banks and KFB on serial rushes in the market, the case
of 1997 Korea￿ s ￿nancial crisis provides the empirical evidence that supports my
model of contagion mechanism: co-creditors￿learning behavior.
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, focusing on liquidity crises in non-￿nancial institutions, I studied
that even though the states of two ￿rms￿fundamentals are not closely related with
each other, what happened in one ￿rm a⁄ects the optimal behavior of creditors in
the other ￿rm, and thus it a⁄ects what happens in that latter ￿rm. The contagion
mechanism between non-￿nancial ￿rms is based on co-creditors￿learning behavior
which has received little attention from existing literatures. Looking at creditors￿
learning behavior is very important because in a rollover coordination game, cred-
itors￿beliefs about others￿type a⁄ect the probability of occurrence of the liquidity
crisis in that ￿rm, i.e., creditors￿learning behavior can be very useful in explaining
the creditors￿strategic complementarities in a coordination game. Learning and
updating their beliefs on others￿type after observing what occurred in one ￿rm,
creditors determine their actions in the latter ￿rm, which a⁄ects the probability
of the liquidity crisis in the latter ￿rm. I discussed the real-world example (i.e.,
Korea￿ s ￿nancial crisis in 1997) which supports my model.
By analyzing the contagion process with creditors￿ learning, I found a very
noticeable feature of the contagion which is di⁄erent from the view of other previous
contagion-related literatures: the contagion impact of the liquidity crisis originating
from the ￿rm having a low failure point is more severe than otherwise under the
27See Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler [K-L-S] (2001); and Kaminsky and Reinhart [K-R]
(2000). K-R (2000) documented that on the eve of Korea￿ s ￿nancial crisis, Japanese and U.S.
banks￿claims were held in Korea, and showed their withdrawals from Korea in the period of ￿-
nancial crisis. K-L-S (2001) analyzed the international mutual funds￿withdrawals in Asian crises
including when Korea su⁄ered ￿nancial crisis.
28KFB went bankrupt right after Jinro￿ s failure.
29The others were local commercial banks.
30Here, foreign banks and KFB, for example, can be thought of pessimistic creditors in my
model due to the information disadvantage and a weak balance sheet, respectively.
19assumptions that the exact realization of the fundamentals of the ￿rm and the
result of creditors￿actions in that ￿rm are known to creditors before they decide
their actions in the other ￿rm. Moreover, even though increasing the accuracy of
creditors￿information on the ￿rm￿ s fundamentals reduces the probability of the
liquidity crisis in an individual ￿rm, it increases the severity of contagion. I dealt
with policy proposals addressing how to mitigate the severity of contagion including
the government￿ s provision of bailouts to the ￿rm su⁄ering a transitory liquidity
problem and its ￿nancial disclosure policy. Also, the ￿rm can initially reduce the





The proportion of creditors who do not roll over the loan conditional on ￿B is
expressed as follows:
lB (￿B) = Pr[xB ￿ x￿
B j ￿B]
= Pr[￿B + "B ￿ x￿
B j ￿B]
= Pr["B ￿ x￿
B ￿ ￿B j ￿B]
=
x￿
B ￿ ￿B + "
2"
:
The critical threshold value of ￿rm B￿ s fundamentals (i.e., switching fundamentals)
is determined by:
￿￿







From the fact that creditors￿present value of the expected utility of rolling over
the loan should be equal to the payo⁄ from recalling the loan, I get:
K = Pr[rollover is successful j x￿
B] ￿ ￿P




B ￿ "B ￿ ￿￿
BP j x￿
B] ￿ ￿P
























20The proportion of creditors who do not roll over the loan conditional on ￿B is
expressed as follows:
lB (￿B) = ￿Pr[xB1 ￿ x￿
B1 j ￿B] + (1 ￿ ￿)Pr[xB2 ￿ x￿
B2 j ￿B]
= ￿Pr[￿B + "B1 ￿ x￿
B1 j ￿B] + (1 ￿ ￿)Pr[￿B + "B2 ￿ x￿
B2 j ￿B]
= ￿Pr["B1 ￿ x￿
B1 ￿ ￿B j ￿B] + (1 ￿ ￿)Pr["B2 ￿ x￿
B2 ￿ ￿B j ￿B]
= ￿
x￿
B1 ￿ ￿B + "
2"
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
x￿
B2 ￿ ￿B + "
2"
:
The critical threshold value of ￿rm B￿ s fundamentals (i.e., switching fundamentals)
is determined by:
￿￿












From the fact that creditors￿present value of the expected utility of rolling over
the loan should be equal to the payo⁄ from recalling the loan, I get the following
equations for "optimistic" group 1 creditors and "pessimistic" group 2 creditors:
K = Pr[rollover is successful j x￿
B1] ￿ ￿O




B1 ￿ "B1 ￿ ￿￿
BO j x￿
B1] ￿ ￿O











K = Pr[rollover is successful j x￿
B2] ￿ ￿P




B2 ￿ "B2 ￿ ￿￿
BO j x￿
B2] ￿ ￿P
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